From the legal standard

Abstract

We assume that law handles language that could either be called natural language, or if we have to stick to the meddling of linguistics within the legal realm, "language — object". Piaget himself concluded that the source of thought should be sought in symbolic function, this being the product of the formation of representations. Many are the theorists and philosophers of law who work the law as a system similar to that of the exact sciences; such as the application of mathematical language to certain models such as physics, chemistry or economics. Language, by making possible the linkage of concrete reality with abstract universality, constitutes the measure of uniform understanding of all reality, being therefore the intelligible form of existence and movement. It should not be forgotten that legal language is particularly vague and ambiguous. The plan of trying to frame the law in rigorous language is an obligatory and difficult ideal of this science. Moreover, this very concept of 'science' is also highly ambiguous, and if used in a specific direction, it must be moved away from both Plato and Husserl.